

Integrating Human Resource Risk Management to Strengthen Organizational Resilience

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ARTICLE INFO

Keywords: Human Resource Risk, Organizational Resilience, Competency Coverage, Knowledge Continuity, Risk Governance

Received : 18, February

Revised : 20, April

Accepted: 22, June

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ABSTRACT

This article develops a conceptual framework connecting human resource management with organizational risk and resilience. A focused narrative review integrates the resource-based perspective, job demands-resources theory, empirical turnover research, and institutional guidance published between 1994 and 2025. The synthesis identifies competency gaps, critical employee turnover, psychosocial exposure, and weak knowledge continuity as interconnected risk pathways. It proposes a management cycle linking risk identification, contextual assessment, preventive controls, and monitored outcomes. The framework distinguishes workforce indicators from evidence of control effectiveness and emphasizes shared accountability between human resource and operational managers. These propositions provide a basis for organizational assessment and future empirical testing; they do not establish causal effects.

INTRODUCTION

Organizations depend on employees to operate technology, maintain service quality, and preserve practical knowledge. A vacancy in a critical role can interrupt an otherwise adequately funded process. Similarly, employees may remain in their positions while lacking the competence or working conditions required to perform reliably. Human resource management therefore concerns both capability development and exposure to disruption. This article examines their connection through the specific problem of maintaining critical organizational work when skills, staffing, or working conditions become inadequate. Recent workforce evidence makes this problem relevant. In the World Economic Forum's 2025 employer survey, 63% of respondents identified skills gaps as a major barrier to transformation during 2025–2030. These findings describe surveyed employers' expectations, rather than observed outcomes for every organization or evidence specific to Indonesia (World Economic Forum, 2025). They nevertheless support examining how development decisions relate to operational vulnerability.

People-related risk cannot be reduced to individual employee failure. Staffing decisions, unclear responsibilities, inappropriate incentives, and insufficient supervision can create conditions in which errors become more likely. Treating every incident as a training problem may leave these conditions unchanged. The analytical task is to connect a risk event with its causes, affected objectives, and feasible controls. The contribution of this article is a proposed link between strategic human resource practices and a practical risk register. It combines capability protection with work design and knowledge continuity, while separating literature-based evidence from author-developed recommendations. The article asks how human resource risks can be classified, how those risks may affect organizational continuity, and which controls and indicators organizations could use to assess their response.

The central problem concerns a gap between formal staffing arrangements and actual service capability. A unit may meet its approved headcount while depending on a single employee for an essential approval, reconciliation, or technical judgment. Conventional personnel reports can miss this dependence because they count positions rather than the work that employees can reliably complete. A continuity-oriented assessment therefore needs a more precise unit: the critical task and the conditions required for its completion. This focus also clarifies the relationship between risk management and resilience. In this article, human resource risk management means the organized assessment and treatment of uncertainty involving people, work arrangements, and organizational objectives. Organizational resilience concerns the ability to prepare for disruption, sustain an acceptable response, and adapt afterward. A completed risk register is an input to these capabilities. Its existence does not demonstrate that the organization can maintain service when a key employee becomes unavailable.

Three questions structure the analysis. First, which workforce vulnerabilities can threaten critical work even when formal staffing appears adequate? Second, through what organizational mechanisms might human resource practices address those vulnerabilities? Third, what evidence would allow managers and researchers to distinguish a functioning control from an administrative activity? These questions narrow the article to operationally relevant relationships and avoid treating every favorable human resource outcome as proof of resilience.

The intended contribution is an assessment framework that researchers can investigate and managers can pilot. It does not propose a universal list of risk scores or a validated resilience scale. Instead, it identifies the connections that an assessment should document: objectives, task dependencies, risk events, existing safeguards, implementation evidence, and outcomes. These connections make assumptions visible and allow an organization to revise a proposed treatment when evidence contradicts the initial explanation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Resource Based Perspective

Wright et al. (1994) explain how human resources may meet the conditions for sustained competitive advantage, including value, rarity, imperfect imitability, and limited substitutability. This perspective supports examining what an organization stands to lose when important expertise disappears. It does not imply that every employee departure has equal strategic consequences. The significance of a departure depends partly on the capability involved and the availability of substitutes. This article extends that reasoning into a testable risk proposition. A role becomes vulnerable when organizational objectives depend on knowledge that few people possess and that cannot be transferred quickly. The proposed response is to map capabilities at the task level, identify qualified substitutes, and verify whether documented procedures enable another employee to complete the work. This application is a conceptual inference, not a result established by the original theory.

Job Demands and Resources

Bakker et al. (2023) review job demands-resources theory in relation to burnout and engagement. The theory offers a way to examine how the work environment affects employees rather than assigning all responsibility to personal resilience. Demands and available resources must be considered in context, including interactions between individuals, teams, and their surroundings. For the present framework, this perspective motivates assessing workload alongside staffing, decision authority, supervisor support, and recovery opportunities. The proposed risk pathway is that sustained imbalance can weaken reliable performance and continuity. The magnitude and timing of that pathway require direct investigation. The article therefore treats work redesign as a candidate control rather than claiming a quantified reduction in operational incidents.

Turnover and Organizational Performance

Park and Shaw (2013) synthesize evidence on turnover rates and organizational performance. Their meta-analysis identifies a negative overall relationship and variation across organizational and contextual factors. This evidence supports attention to turnover while cautioning against a universal interpretation of any single turnover rate. An organization should consequently distinguish overall turnover from the departure of employees who maintain critical services. In the proposed framework, departure frequency, replacement time, knowledge transfer, and operational consequences are separate measures. A stable aggregate turnover rate could coexist with a serious continuity problem if departures concentrate in a small specialist team.

Risk Governance and Employee Protection

ISO 31000 provides guidelines for identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, and communicating risk, with integration into organizational governance (International Organization for Standardization [ISO], 2018). It provides a general management structure rather than a predetermined human resource scoring system. Organizations still need to define objectives and assessment criteria appropriate to their own operations. The World Health Organization (WHO, 2022) recommends organizational interventions, manager and worker training, and support for participation in work. This guidance places employee protection within the organizational response. The framework developed here uses that principle to propose participatory assessment and preventive work design, alongside confidential access to appropriate support.

Organizational Resilience and Strategic Human Resource Management

Duchek (2020) conceptualizes organizational resilience through anticipation, coping, and adaptation. This distinction gives the present article a temporal structure. Staffing coverage before an interruption, work coordination during it, and revisions afterward represent different assessment targets. Measuring one target cannot establish that the other capabilities exist. Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011) explain how strategic human resource management can support resilience through employee contributions and organizational processes. Their conceptual argument connects individual capabilities with collective organizational capacity. It supports examining the arrangement of human resource practices rather than treating recruitment, development, and work coordination as unrelated interventions.

Building on these perspectives, the present framework treats preparedness and response as connected but separately observable. Preparedness might involve a tested substitute and an accessible procedure. Response might involve activating that substitute while preserving service quality. Adaptation might involve revising the procedure after an exercise exposes a hidden dependency. These are proposed operational applications, not measurement items validated by the cited studies.

The distinction prevents an overly narrow interpretation of resilience as returning to previous staffing levels. Restoring the old arrangement may reproduce dependence on one specialist. An adaptive response would examine whether work allocation, authorization, or documentation should change. The appropriate decision depends on service requirements, available resources, and the consequences of a failed handover.

Psychological Safety and Organizational Learning

Edmondson (1999) defines team psychological safety in relation to interpersonal risk taking and reports an association with learning behavior in a study of manufacturing work teams. This finding provides a focused reason to consider whether employees can disclose uncertainty and errors. It does not establish the effectiveness of the risk register proposed here or describe conditions in Indonesian organizations. For the current framework, employee voice is a source of information about how critical work actually proceeds. Staff may know that an instruction is outdated, a substitute lacks access, or an approval depends on informal contact with one person. An assessment that excludes this knowledge may document the official process while missing the conditions under which the process fails.

The proposed managerial response is to invite task-specific feedback and record how management acts on it. Asking whether a handover instruction can be followed provides more actionable information than asking employees to declare that the organization is resilient. Managers should distinguish reports of uncertainty from misconduct and provide channels suited to the sensitivity of the issue. These recommendations remain subject to evaluation in the setting where they are applied.

Integration and Conceptual Propositions

Three propositions guide the conceptual framework. P1 proposes that verified competency coverage is associated with fewer disruptions in critical tasks. P2 proposes that knowledge transfer and succession coverage weaken the association between critical employee departures and service interruption. P3 proposes that improvements in work demands and resources are associated with improved workforce stability and continuity. These propositions remain untested in this article. The three propositions address different mechanisms. Competency coverage concerns whether required capability is available. Knowledge transfer and succession concern whether capability remains accessible when personnel change. Work demands and resources concern the conditions under which employees can use that capability reliably. These mechanisms may operate together, but researchers should avoid merging them into a single score before establishing their meaning and measurement properties.

The proposed model places critical work between human resource practices and organizational outcomes. Recruitment or training can influence continuity only if it changes a relevant capability or condition and that change supports service delivery. Organizational size, task complexity, technology dependence, and labor market constraints may affect each connection. The framework therefore anticipates variation across settings rather than assuming uniform effects.

Table 1. Theoretical Contributions and Proposed Assessment Questions

Perspective	Contribution	Assessment Question
Resource based perspective	Strategic significance of capabilities	Which difficult-to-replace capability supports the critical task?
Job demands and resources	Work conditions and reliable performance	Do time, staffing, authority, and support match the task?
Turnover evidence	Context-sensitive departure consequences	Which departures remove capabilities that are hard to replace?
Resilience perspective	Anticipation, coping, and adaptation	Can the unit prepare, respond, and revise its arrangements?
Organizational learning	Disclosure and review of uncertainty	Can employees report failed controls and obtain a response?

Source: Author-developed conceptual synthesis. Proposed measures and applications require local evaluation.

METHODOLOGY

This article uses a focused narrative literature review and conceptual synthesis. It does not report a systematic review, meta-analysis, survey, or organizational case study. The unit of analysis is the relationship between human resource practices, people-related exposure, and the continuity of critical work. No participants were recruited, and no primary employee data were collected. The review drew on an initial targeted search dated October 16, 2026, and additional searches on October 19, 2026, to examine resilience, strategic human resource management, psychological safety, and literature review methodology. Search expressions included “organizational resilience capability based conceptualization,” “strategic human resource management organizational resilience,” “psychological safety learning behavior work teams,” and “literature review research methodology guidelines.” Publisher records, university repositories, and official institutional pages supported source identification and bibliographic checking.

The synthesis uses ten core sources: Wright et al. (1994), Edmondson (1999), Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011), Park and Shaw (2013), ISO (2018), Snyder (2019), Duchek (2020), WHO (2022), Bakker et al. (2023), and World Economic Forum (2025). A relevant Indonesian publication by Gunawan and Elisabet (2024) provides a contextual reference to compensation and employee performance. Its inclusion does not supply national prevalence estimates or establish the framework's effectiveness. Sources were selected purposively for an identifiable contribution to capability, staffing continuity, working conditions, learning, resilience, or review design. Snyder (2019) discusses the importance of aligning a literature review's purpose with its methodological approach. Here, the purpose is conceptual integration rather than exhaustive evidence retrieval. No search-result counts, duplicate removal totals, or screening agreement statistics are reported because this review did not maintain a systematic screening database.

The source material available for synthesis varied. It included accessible article content, abstracts, publisher metadata, repository summaries, and institutional guidance. The review does not claim full-text appraisal of every publication. Bibliographic verification confirms the identity of a source; it does not establish that its findings are transferable to every sector. The analysis therefore separates empirical observations, theoretical explanations, guidance, and the article's own proposals. The analytic procedure first identified each source's relevant concept and the level at which it operated. It then linked that concept to a workforce vulnerability and an objective potentially affected by the vulnerability. The next step proposed controls whose operation could be checked through records, task demonstrations, or exercises. A final comparison examined whether the proposed indicators measured an activity, an intermediate capability, or a continuity outcome. This is an author-conducted interpretive synthesis, not independent duplicate coding.

The review assessed conceptual coherence by asking whether each proposed control addressed an identified condition and whether the suggested evidence could reasonably demonstrate its operation. This check helps identify internal inconsistencies. It does not replace formal quality appraisal, construct validation, or intervention evaluation. Contradictory possibilities, including workload displacement and misleading indicators, were retained in the discussion rather than excluded from the framework. No pooled effect estimates, organizational risk scores, or statistical tests were calculated. The article contains no participants, interviews, personnel records, or measured service interruptions. Tables organize proposed relationships and management choices. The administrative scenario is explicitly hypothetical. Consequently, the results are products of conceptual synthesis, and all statements about intervention effectiveness remain propositions for future investigation.

RESEARCH RESULT

A Classification of Human Resource Risks

The synthesis produces a proposed classification around four sources of vulnerability: insufficient competence, loss of critical employees, harmful or unsustainable work conditions, and dependence on undocumented knowledge. These categories can overlap. For example, a specialist departure may create both a capability gap and additional workload for remaining employees. The classification is intended to structure assessment; it does not estimate how common each risk is.

Table 2. Proposed Human Resource Risk and Control Register

Risk event	Possible consequence	Proposed control	Review indicator
Required skills unavailable	Errors or delayed critical tasks	Task assessment and targeted development	Critical tasks with qualified coverage
Critical employee leaves	Vacancy and service interruption	Succession and supported handover	Critical roles with a tested substitute
Demands exceed resources	Exhaustion and reduced reliability	Workload review and participatory redesign	Overtime trends and workload feedback
Essential knowledge inaccessible	Dependence on one employee	Current procedures and transfer exercises	Procedures independently demonstrated

Source: Author-developed conceptual synthesis. Proposed measures and applications require local evaluation.

Defining the Critical Task and Its Dependencies

A critical task is an activity whose interruption would prevent a unit from meeting an agreed objective within an acceptable period. Criticality depends on the consequence and timing of interruption. A frequently performed activity may tolerate a short delay, while a less frequent authorization may have an immediate deadline. Managers should state the objective before ranking the task so that operational importance does not become a proxy for hierarchy or job prestige. The proposed assessment records what the task requires beyond an employee's presence. Relevant dependencies include competence, decision authority, system access, valid source information, and coordination with other roles. A substitute who knows the process but lacks approval rights does not provide complete coverage. Likewise, two trained employees who are always assigned to the same shift may leave an uncovered period. Capability coverage must therefore account for both qualification and availability.

This task-level view also makes hidden dependencies visible. A procedure might require an external specialist, a shared system, or information held by another department. The assessment should record the dependency and the person responsible for coordinating it. Listing only employees within the focal unit can create a false impression of self-sufficiency and produce a treatment that fails when the wider process is disrupted.

Competency Risk and Verification Of Coverage

Competency risk arises when the capability needed for a task is unavailable, insufficient, or not usable in the circumstances in which the task must be performed. A job title, qualification, or course certificate may provide relevant background evidence. None automatically confirms that an employee can complete the current task using the organization's systems and quality requirements. Verification should therefore refer to the work itself and the consequences of an incorrect result. An assessment can use a supervised demonstration, review of completed work, or a structured simulation appropriate to the task. The assessor should define acceptable performance before observing the demonstration. This protects against declaring competence simply because the employee completed a familiar routine. The assessment should also include recognition of exceptions and the point at which the employee should seek further authorization.

Development follows the diagnosed gap. A knowledge gap may require instruction and practice. An access problem may require an authorization change. An unclear responsibility may require a revised process. This distinction matters because additional training cannot resolve every cause of failure. The proposed framework judges a development action by whether the identified gap closes and the critical task gains reliable coverage.

Turnover Risk and Succession Readiness

The continuity consequence of a departure depends on what the organization loses and how quickly it can restore the affected capability. A vacancy count alone cannot answer that question. The assessment should identify pending responsibilities, replacement constraints, and work that other employees cannot yet complete. It should also distinguish planned exits, unexpected absences, internal transfers, and departures occurring during periods of unusually high demand. Succession readiness has several elements: an identified substitute, adequate competence, authorized access, sufficient time, and a workable handover. An organization may have the first element while lacking the others. The proposed evidence of readiness is a documented exercise or real handover reviewed against task requirements. A named successor who cannot complete the task without extensive intervention remains a candidate for development rather than a fully functioning control.

Retention and substitution address different time horizons. Retention may preserve an important relationship or capability, while substitution reduces exposure if retention fails. Managers should consider both without assuming that financial incentives resolve every cause of departure. They should also assess whether succession responsibilities increase the workload of the same employees whose availability the control is intended to protect.

Work Demands and the Conditions of Reliable Performance

Workload assessment should connect demands with the resources needed to meet them. The number of assignments may be informative, but task difficulty, interruptions, deadline clustering, and decision requirements also matter. A unit with stable headcount can face changing exposure when a new system or reporting requirement increases the time needed for each case. The assessment should examine the actual work period rather than rely only on annual staffing plans. A proposed response starts by identifying a specific source of overload. Options include redistributing tasks, clarifying priorities, reducing unnecessary approval steps, adjusting schedules, or providing additional support. Each option has a possible tradeoff. Redistribution can transfer strain to another team, while removing an approval can weaken an important safeguard. A treatment decision should state both its intended benefit and the conditions that could make it unsuitable.

Feedback should assess whether employees experience a practical change and whether service outcomes remain acceptable. A fall in overtime can reflect improved allocation, reduced demand, or unrecorded work. A reduction in reported problems can reflect improvement or lower willingness to report. Combining administrative records with structured discussion makes these alternative explanations more visible without assuming that any single indicator captures the full condition.

Knowledge Continuity and Usable Documentation

Knowledge continuity concerns whether essential task knowledge remains accessible and usable when the usual employee is unavailable. A document repository is only one component. Instructions must reflect current systems, identify exceptions, and specify where authority resides. Managers should also determine whether a substitute can locate the correct version when time is limited. The existence of a file does not demonstrate that its content can sustain service. A transfer exercise can reveal missing steps that the original author performs automatically. The substitute follows the instruction while the observer records points requiring explanation. The organization then revises the procedure and repeats the relevant part of the exercise. For sensitive or high-consequence work, the exercise should use an appropriate test environment or supervised case rather than expose live services to unnecessary error. Documentation also requires ownership. A named owner should review changes after system updates, revised responsibilities, or a significant incident. Where confidentiality limits access, the procedure should explain the authorized route for obtaining necessary information. Broadly sharing sensitive material is not a substitute for designing a secure and workable handover.

Distinguishing Activity from Control Effectiveness

A central analytical distinction concerns what an indicator can demonstrate. Training attendance establishes participation. It does not establish competence in a critical task. Similarly, naming a successor establishes an administrative designation but does not demonstrate readiness to assume responsibility. The framework therefore proposes pairing activity indicators with evidence from task demonstrations, handover exercises, or operational outcomes. This distinction also applies to employee feedback. A change in reported workload could reflect different working conditions, response rates, or willingness to speak. Managers should examine the circumstances of measurement before interpreting a trend. Indicator definitions should identify the relevant population, period, data source, and decision rule. Thresholds should follow local objectives and evidence rather than an assumed universal benchmark.

The framework separates control design, implementation, and outcome evidence. Design asks whether the proposed action addresses the identified risk. Implementation asks whether the action occurred and remains available. Outcome evidence asks whether critical work performed as intended under relevant conditions. A training program may pass the implementation test while leaving task coverage unchanged. A documented procedure may be logically sound but inaccessible during an absence. This separation supports a proportionate review. Managers need not evaluate every action with a complex statistical model. They should select evidence suited to the decision and recognize its limits. An exercise can demonstrate readiness for the scenario tested. It cannot establish readiness for every disruption. A period without incidents is encouraging but provides weak evidence where exposure is infrequent or reporting is incomplete.

Table 3. Proposed Indicator Definitions and Interpretation Limits

Indicator	Operational definition	Interpretation limit
Verified task coverage	Critical tasks with a currently available qualified operator divided by all mapped critical tasks	Depends on a credible task map and assessment criteria
Tested substitute coverage	Critical roles with a substitute meeting competence, access, and availability requirements divided by mapped critical roles	A substitute may be counted across roles that fail together
Transfer completion	Scheduled handovers demonstrated to agreed criteria divided by handovers due	Completion does not establish long-term retention
Disruption duration	Elapsed time from a defined service interruption to agreed minimum restoration	Must specify service boundary and restoration criterion

Indicator	Operational definition	Interpretation limit
Workload exposure	Recorded overtime and unresolved workload concerns for a defined team and period	Requires interpretation with demand and reporting context

Source: Author-developed conceptual synthesis. Proposed measures and applications require local evaluation.

A Proposed Implementation Sequence

Implementation begins by selecting a critical service and identifying the tasks that keep it functioning. Human resource and operational managers then record possible failures, underlying conditions, existing controls, and responsible owners. They assess likelihood and consequence using documented local criteria. An organization with limited historical data should record uncertainty and use structured discussion rather than present unsupported precision. The next step is to select feasible treatments and test their operation. For example, managers can ask a designated substitute to complete a routine critical task using the available instructions under appropriate supervision. A failed demonstration identifies a specific gap for correction. Periodic review then compares control evidence with actual disruptions and employee feedback. This sequence is an author-developed application of a general risk process, not an empirically evaluated intervention.

The initial pilot should select a service with clear outputs, identifiable task owners, and records that can support review. Managers should agree on the scope and acceptable service requirements before proposing controls. An overly broad pilot can produce many entries without enough time to test any treatment. A narrower pilot allows the team to check whether the framework captures real dependencies and supports useful decisions. For each risk, the register should describe an event, its plausible cause, its consequence, and the existing safeguards. "Staff problem" is too vague to guide treatment. "A required approval cannot be completed during the authorized officer's absence" identifies a testable event. The team can then investigate whether the cause concerns authority, competence, access, scheduling, or a combination of conditions.

Review should compare intended control operation with observed evidence. An unresolved action should retain an owner, a next step, and a reason for delay. A completed action should retain the evidence used to close it. This creates a traceable distinction between administrative completion and demonstrated readiness. The pilot can then identify which entries need better definitions before the register expands to additional services.

Assigning Ownership and Escalation

Operational ownership should remain close to the work. The manager responsible for a service is positioned to explain deadlines, dependencies, and the consequences of interruption. Human resource staff can support recruitment, competence development, role design, and workforce records. Technology and other support functions should participate when the treatment depends on access or system availability. Assigning every people-related risk to the human resource department would overlook these operational responsibilities.

Senior management should resolve decisions that exceed a unit's authority or resources. Escalation is appropriate when a critical service lacks feasible coverage, two units cannot agree on responsibility, or the proposed treatment creates a significant competing exposure. The record should state what decision is required and what temporary arrangement applies. Escalation without a clear decision request can delay action while giving the appearance that the issue has been addressed. Employees contribute information about feasibility and practical workarounds. Their participation should include opportunities to check whether the recorded process matches actual work. Management remains responsible for decisions and resources. Consultation should not transfer accountability for structural staffing or workload problems to employees who lack authority to change them.

Table 4. Proposed Responsibilities and Evidence of Completion

Role	Main responsibility	Evidence for review
Service manager	Define critical work and test continuity arrangements	Approved task map and exercise record
Human resource manager	Coordinate staffing, development, and succession support	Gap analysis and verified development follow-up
Employees and substitutes	Explain work requirements and demonstrate assigned tasks	Observed handover and recorded difficulties
Support functions	Maintain required access and process dependencies	Authorized access test and resolved support actions
Senior management	Set priorities and resolve resource decisions	Recorded decisions and residual-risk acceptance

Source: Author-developed conceptual synthesis. Proposed measures and applications require local evaluation.

DISCUSSION

Connecting Capability Investment with Continuity

The proposed framework changes the managerial question from how much training the organization provides to whether employees can perform the tasks on which objectives depend. This interpretation connects the resource-based perspective to continuity planning. Capability development becomes easier to prioritize when managers can identify an exposed task, the competence needed, and the consequence of insufficient coverage. Organizations would still need to test whether the selected intervention produces the intended result. In a university administration unit, for example, a hypothetical risk assessment might examine whether more than one authorized employee can process an essential academic record. The relevant evidence would concern task competence, access arrangements, documentation, and continuity during absence. This illustration does not describe an investigated institution or establish a risk at any named university.

This connection changes how managers assess the value of development. Course completion is relevant when it helps close a defined gap in critical work. Broader learning can still serve career development and future strategy, but its purpose should remain explicit. Confusing these purposes can produce an unrealistic claim that every learning activity directly protects current service continuity. The proposed assessment also helps identify when development is insufficient. A trained employee may lack time, authority, or access to use the new capability. Conversely, a process simplification may reduce the need for scarce expertise without reducing quality. Managers should compare feasible alternatives against the same service objective. The framework supports that comparison by making the underlying dependency visible.

Investment priorities should consider the consequence of interruption, the time required to restore capability, and the feasibility of treatment. They should not depend solely on how visibly a department requests training. A modest handover exercise may expose an important continuity gap, while an expensive development program may address a less urgent objective. The article proposes this decision logic without assigning monetary benefits or claiming that one intervention is always preferable.

Interpreting Retention and Work Design Together

The turnover literature supports examining departures in their organizational context (Park & Shaw, 2013). The framework adds a proposed operational question: which departures remove capabilities that are difficult to replace? Retention priorities could then reflect role criticality and replacement constraints. Any retention intervention should also examine fairness and workload so that protecting one specialist role does not create avoidable strain elsewhere. The job demands–resources perspective helps frame that examination (Bakker et al., 2023). In practical terms, the article proposes checking whether a staffing shortage has redistributed work beyond the available resources. This recommendation follows the conceptual integration; it does not establish that a particular scheduling policy will reduce turnover. A local evaluation should examine both employee experience and service outcomes before judging success.

Gunawan and Elisabet (2024) address compensation and employee performance in a company-specific Indonesian publication. Its relevance here is contextual: compensation belongs among the work arrangements that managers may need to examine. It does not establish how strongly compensation affects continuity in other organizations or validate a particular retention intervention. A practical retention review should examine the reasons a capability is difficult to sustain. Pay may matter, but role ambiguity, limited development opportunities, unstable scheduling, and persistent overload may also require investigation. The organization should collect local evidence before choosing a response. Applying a familiar intervention without diagnosing the cause can leave the main exposure unchanged. Substitution can itself affect retention. Repeatedly asking a small group of reliable employees to cover absences may concentrate responsibility and reduce time for their own tasks. The proposed control could therefore create a new demand. Review should examine the distribution of coverage work, the support provided, and whether the arrangement remains feasible during simultaneous absences.

Continuity Across Anticipation Response and Adaptation

The resilience perspective encourages managers to ask different questions at different moments. Before disruption, the concern is whether dependencies are known and feasible arrangements exist. During disruption, the concern is whether those arrangements support acceptable decisions and outputs. Afterward, the concern is what the organization should change. The present article uses these stages to organize assessment, following the temporal distinction in Duchek (2020). A pre-event exercise can test the activation of a substitute, but a real disruption can reveal conditions that the exercise did not include. Managers should record deviations and their consequences rather than treating every deviation as evidence of poor preparation. Some improvisation may be necessary. The review should establish whether the adaptation preserved essential safeguards and whether it should become part of the documented arrangement. Learning requires a decision after the review. A report that identifies a problem but does not change responsibility, resources, or procedure leaves the dependency intact. The proposed framework therefore connects post-event learning with the next assessment cycle. Completion means the organization has considered and tested a relevant change, or has explicitly accepted the remaining exposure with a documented reason.

An Illustrative Administrative Application

Consider a hypothetical academic administration unit responsible for processing records before a fixed registration deadline. One employee normally performs a validation step, and another employee is listed as the substitute. The scenario assumes no named institution and contains no observed data. Its purpose is to demonstrate how the framework changes the questions asked during assessment. The initial task map identifies four requirements: knowledge of validation rules, permission to use the relevant system, authority to release the record, and available time before the deadline. A supervised exercise then asks the substitute to process a test case. Suppose the substitute can identify errors but

cannot complete release because the approval authority has not been delegated. The exercise would reveal an authorization gap rather than establish a general training failure.

The proposed treatment would clarify the authorized release route, confirm access, and repeat the relevant exercise. The service manager would also examine the substitute's other responsibilities during registration. If the substitute cannot perform both workloads, a staffing or scheduling response would be needed. Closing the access issue alone would leave the availability condition unresolved. The next review would consider whether the test case reflected normal and exceptional work. It would also examine whether procedures remained current after a system change. A successful exercise would support readiness for the tested conditions. It would not prove that the unit could manage simultaneous absences, a system outage, or an unusually large demand surge. Those scenarios would require separate assessment. The example illustrates the framework's practical contribution: it links an observable task failure with a specific condition and a reviewable action. It also shows why a generic indicator such as "two staff trained" can overstate continuity. No numerical improvement, institutional performance result, or intervention effect is inferred from this hypothetical application.

Interdependencies and Competing Treatment Effects

Risks can reinforce each other. A departure may reduce available capability and increase workload, while delayed documentation makes the replacement process slower. Treating each entry separately can conceal this sequence. The register should therefore identify important links and note when one treatment depends on another. The organization should also examine whether several critical tasks rely on the same substitute or support function. Controls may introduce new exposure. Standardization can improve consistency while making an outdated instruction influential across several units. Cross-training can broaden coverage while reducing the time employees spend maintaining specialist competence. A central support team can provide expertise while becoming a shared point of dependence. These possibilities do not invalidate the controls; they identify conditions that the review should examine. The decision should consider residual exposure after treatment rather than assume that completing an action eliminates the risk. Where uncertainty remains substantial, managers can record what is known, what is assumed, and what additional evidence would change the decision. This approach supports proportionate action without presenting judgment-based assessment as a precise forecast.

Shared Responsibility and Proportionate Information Use

The framework assigns operational managers responsibility for work allocation and service continuity, human resource managers responsibility for development and staffing processes, and senior management responsibility for priorities and resources. Employees contribute knowledge about how work actually proceeds. These assignments are proposed governance choices, which organizations should adapt to their structures.

Monitoring should collect information necessary for a stated decision. Team-level indicators can guide staffing or work redesign without treating an individual mental health condition as evidence of poor performance. Confidential reporting and appropriate support should accompany assessment. The WHO guidance provides support for organizational and participation-oriented responses, while the specific indicator design remains a local responsibility (WHO, 2022). The framework's contribution is integrative and practical rather than a claim of a new causal theory. It links distinct bodies of evidence to a common assessment structure and makes the status of each recommendation explicit. Its value will depend on whether future studies demonstrate useful measurement, feasible controls, and better continuity under real organizational conditions.

A dashboard should support a stated operational decision. Aggregating more personnel data does not automatically improve that decision. For example, a task-coverage review needs information about qualification and availability; it may not need an employee's private health details. The assessment should define the required information, who can access it, and how long it remains relevant to the review. Interpretation should also avoid treating employees as interchangeable risk units. A person's absence becomes an organizational vulnerability when the service lacks workable coverage. The management question concerns the arrangement of work and support. This framing allows the organization to address continuity while preserving a fair assessment of the employee's role and circumstances. Employees should understand how information will be used and how errors can be corrected. A process for checking task assignments and competence records can improve both fairness and data quality. Where reporting may expose a worker to criticism, management should examine whether the channel allows meaningful disclosure. These are proposed design conditions for the framework, not a claim that a particular monitoring system has already met them.

Measurement Interpretation and Alternative Explanations

A credible evaluation needs stable definitions. If the organization expands its definition of critical tasks, verified coverage may fall even when employees gain capability. If managers record interruptions more carefully, incident counts may rise despite better control. Analysts should preserve the measurement history and explain changes in coverage, reporting, and service demand before drawing conclusions from trends. The denominator is particularly important. A coverage percentage based only on tasks selected for training cannot describe the entire service. Replacement time measured only for successfully filled vacancies excludes unresolved cases. Average restoration time can hide a small number of severe interruptions. The proposed indicators therefore require a defined population and period, alongside information about incomplete or exceptional observations.

Researchers should also distinguish perceived readiness from demonstrated readiness. Surveys can capture confidence and employee experience, while exercises can reveal task-level limitations. Neither measure alone captures the full construct. Agreement between methods can strengthen interpretation, and disagreement can identify an issue requiring investigation. It should not be resolved by automatically privileging the more favorable indicator. Improved continuity after an intervention may reflect other changes, including lower demand, a new information system, additional funding, or a change in service requirements. An evaluation should record such events and examine plausible alternatives. The current conceptual synthesis cannot resolve these explanations. Its contribution is to specify what future data collection should distinguish.

Applicability and Boundary Conditions

The framework is intended for adaptation across organizations with identifiable critical work. A small organization may rely on informal coordination and limited substitutes. A larger organization may have more personnel but face coordination and authorization barriers. These differences affect feasible controls and the cost of maintaining coverage. The framework does not imply that formal complexity is evidence of better risk management. Sector conditions also matter. A task involving high consequences may require stricter supervision and stronger evidence before a substitute works independently. A routine administrative task may permit a simpler demonstration. Managers should define an acceptable level of evidence in relation to the task rather than impose the same exercise on every role. The article does not prescribe sector-specific professional or regulatory requirements. Indonesian applications require direct study of local structures, resources, and work practices. International literature and a company-specific Indonesian reference cannot establish conditions in universities, public agencies, or firms throughout the country. A local pilot should test whether the categories are understandable and whether the recommended evidence can be collected without imposing excessive work. These findings would inform adaptation before broader implementation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATION

Human resource risks can be examined through the availability of competence, continuity of critical staffing, adequacy of working conditions, and accessibility of essential knowledge. The literature provides reasons to connect these dimensions with organizational performance and continuity. The proposed framework translates those reasons into an assessment structure, but it does not establish causal effects or quantify risk reduction. Organizations can begin with one critical service, map its staffing dependencies, and agree on a small set of clearly defined indicators. They should verify competence and substitute readiness through practical assessment, address work design alongside development needs, and assign responsibility for each treatment. Review should focus on whether controls function and whether critical work remains reliable. Expansion should follow evidence from the initial application.

The synthesis identifies three practical distinctions. Capability differs from participation in development. Succession readiness differs from naming a successor. Evidence of functioning controls differs from the absence of reported incidents. These distinctions help managers connect human resource actions with critical work while keeping the evidential limits visible. A pilot should establish a task map, identify important dependencies, and assign a service owner. It should then test selected controls and record what each test demonstrates. Managers should review the distribution of additional work created by the intervention and include employee feedback when revising the arrangement. Expansion to other units should follow a review of usefulness, feasibility, and remaining uncertainty rather than the number of completed register entries. The article's contribution is an operationally specified conceptual framework. It organizes relationships that deserve empirical investigation and provides examples of evidence that could support that investigation. It does not demonstrate a reduction in turnover, improved employee health, or a causal increase in organizational resilience. Those conclusions require an appropriate empirical design and observations from the setting concerned.

ADVANCED RESEARCH

Further research could test the propositions through longitudinal, multisite studies linking staffing records, task assessments, employee surveys, and documented interruptions. Researchers should distinguish turnover intention from actual departures and account for sector, role criticality, organizational size, and prior performance. Intervention studies could compare continuity before and after a defined control while examining alternative explanations and employee outcomes.

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